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“THE (NEW) NEW COLOSSUS”: AMENDING
THE INVESTOR VISA PROGRAM TO
COMPORT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE
UNITED STATES’ IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND BENEFIT U.S. WORKERS
BRENDAN LEE *
I.

INTRODUCTION
Give me your hired, your entrepreneur,
Your upper classes willing to pay a fee . . .

Taken as a whole, the United States’ relationship with
immigration has been a paradox. On one hand, the United States
has been a “melting pot”—the place where peoples from across the
globe have converged to form our unique cultural heritage.
Indeed, our nation owes its very existence to the millions of
immigrants who have undertaken the voyage to our shores, drawn
by the promise of a better life in the “land of opportunity.” On the
other hand, the United States’ attitude toward immigration, for
more of its history than we care to acknowledge, has been, and
continues to be, inextricably linked to racist, nativist, economic
and other social forces that have pervaded the nation since its
birth.1
For the first one hundred years of its existence, the United
States offered virtually unimpeded access to immigration.2 The
Act of March 3, 1875, known as “The Page Act of 1875,”
represented Congress’ first foray into the restriction of
immigration.3 In effect, the Act, focusing on the exclusion of
prostitutes, particularly Chinese prostitutes, systematically
* St. John’s University School of Law J.D. Candidate, 2016.
1 Kevin R. Johnson, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH 16-17 (2004).
2 See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 3 (14th ed. 2014).
3 Id.
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barred all Chinese women from entering the United States.4 The
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 marked the first instance in which
Congress imposed limitations on immigration explicitly based on
race.5 The Act barred virtually all immigrations of persons of
Chinese ancestry and severely punished Chinese immigrants who
violated its exclusionary provisions.6 Although Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence demands strict scrutiny of racial
classifications for citizens, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
upheld the use of such racial discrimination as a basis for denying
the admission of (noncitizen) immigrants into the United States.7
Over the next fifty years, Congress continually introduced similar
legislation aimed at other groups as well.
By 1924, the prevailing political and social forces8
converged, culminating in the Immigration Act of 1924.9 The Act
established the national origins quota system (“quota system”), a
formulaic device designed to ensure the stability of the ethnic
composition of the United States.10 A House report articulates the
purpose of this act, stating, “[The quota system] is used in an effort
to preserve, as nearly as possible, the racial status quo in the
United States. It is also hoped to guarantee, as best we can at this
late date, racial homogeneity.”11 Although the quota system left a

4
5
6
7

Johnson, supra note 1, at 126.
Johnson, supra note 1, at 17.
Id.
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (noting that “[t]he
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States as part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government,
the interest of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any
one.”).
8 By 1924, political forces such as isolationism in the wake of World War I and prevalent
fears of communism and anarchism combined with social influences such as nativism, social
Darwinism and eugenics, culminated in the National Origins Quota System of the
Immigration Act of 1924.
9 Johnson, supra note 1, at 23. “The racial hierarchy endorsed by proponents of the
national origins quota system was entirely consistent with the academic literature of the
day, which viewed the “races” of southern and eastern Europe as inferior to those of
northern Europe.”
10 Id. at 22.
11 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, REPORT ON
RESTRICTION OF IMMIGRATION, H.R. REP. NO. 68-350, pt. 1, at 13-14, 16 (1924).
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blemish on the world’s perception of the United States, it
nonetheless remained intact until 1965.12
As the twentieth century wore on, popular opinion (most
notably among U.S. Presidents), of the quota system began to
shift. Over the veto of President Harry S. Truman, Congress
maintained the system in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.13 By 1963, it was President John F. Kennedy who urged
Congress to overhaul the United States’ immigration policy,
recommending legislation that concentrated attention primarily
on revision of the “quota immigration system.”14 President Lyndon
B. Johnson shared his predecessor’s belief and sought the
elimination of the quota system, stating, “The system violated the
basic principles of American democracy—the principal that values
and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man.”15
On the heels of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress passed the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”). Seeking to
eliminate the national origins quota system as a basis for the
selection of immigrants for admission to the United States, the
new system was designed to further a number of policy interests,
with preference “based upon the existence of close family
relationships to U.S. citizens and permanent residents,” and
“those professional people whose services are urgently needed in
the United States.”16 To this end, the INA replaced the quotas with
across-the-board annual numerical limits of immigrants from each
nation.17
The INA also marked a colossal shift in the United States’
immigration policy, mandating “a new system of selection for
immigrants which is designed to be fair, rational, humane, and in
the national interests.”18 It is against this mandate that the INA
and subsequent immigration legislation ought to be measured.
12 Johnson, supra note 1, at 24.
13 Id. at 22 (explaining “President Harry S. Truman vetoed the INA [of 1952] (a veto

that Congress overrode) because it carried forward the discriminatory quota system.”).
14 H.R. REP. NO. 89-745 (1965).
15 President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill,
Liberty Island, New York , Oct. 3, 1965, available at
<www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/651003.asp>.
16 89 CONG. REC. 21, 571-72 (1965) (statement of Rep. Delaney).
17 Johnson, supra note 1, at 26.
18 89 CONG. REC. 21 at 571 (1965) (statement of Rep. Delaney).
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The United States’ immigration law (including the INA) fails to
fulfill the mandate of the INA. Although there are no longer
explicitly race-based quotas, the existing ‘per country levels’ create
a de facto barrier to immigrants from certain countries. This Note
addresses our need to fulfill the mandate of the INA by enacting
legislation that seeks to admit immigrants on a “fair, rational,
[and] humane” basis that is “in the national interest.”19
Part I of this Note will examine the failure of the INA, focusing
on the de facto quota system implemented in place of the explicit
national origins quota system. Further, it will show how the
Immigration Act of 1990 failed to address this problem.
Part II of this Note will look specifically at the EB-5 Investor
Visa Program created by the Immigration Act of 1990. This part
will explore the practical usage and advantages conferred to those
who participate in the program. In addition, this part will analyze
how these advantages give rise to disparate effects among
prospective immigrants of differing economic means and thus run
afoul of the INA’s mandate for admission based on “fair, rational,
[and] humane” considerations.
Part III of this Note turns to the twin purpose of the EB-5
Investor Visa Program itself: first, to attract the investment of
foreign capital in the United States, and second, to promote the
creation of U.S. jobs. This part of the Note will examine the
changes Congress made to the EB-5 Investor Visa Program
through the legislation of the Investor Visa Pilot Program and how
that program further favors the goal of attracting capital
investment at the cost of actual job creation. Part IV of this Note
examines how other provisions of the overall EB-5 program also
favor the goal of attracting capital investment at the expense of
actual job creation.
Part V of this note proposes a new immigrant visa preference
category: the EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa Program, which
is designed to provide relief to immigrants subject to the more
onerous de facto quotas imposes by the INA and carried through
by the Immigration Act of 1990 while at the same time overhauling
the EB-5 Investor Visa Program to comport with the overarching

19 Id.
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policy goals set forth in the INA as well as the policy goals of the
program itself.
Finally, Part VI will illustrate how the proposed EB-7
Immigrant Job Creator Visa Program will harmonize the United
States’ immigration law with the overarching policy goals of the
INA.
II.
FAILURE TO ELIMINATE QUOTAS: “PER COUNTRY”
LEVELS
Despite the sweeping changes enacted by the INA, most notably
the abolition of the quota system, it has failed to achieve its
mandate.20 Many aspects of the United States’ immigration laws
disparately impact immigrants from developing nations.21 While
not facially discriminatory, in operation, the INA created
exceedingly long lines for immigrants from four countries in
particular:22 China (mainland-born), India, Mexico, and the
Philippines.23 For example, as of October 2014, the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is processing
only those applications for fourth-preference family-based
immigration visas (brothers and sisters of adult citizens) of
Filipino foreign-nationals filed prior to April 8, 1991.24 This
twenty-three year waiting list for prospective Filipino immigrants
with a U.S. citizen sibling is more than ten years longer than any
other country other than Mexico.25 Similarly, as of October 2014,
USCIS is processing only those applications for third-preference
employment-based visas (skilled workers or professionals
possessing the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree) of Indian foreignnationals filed prior to November 15, 2003.26 This represents a

20 Johnson, supra note 1, at 26.
21 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant Numbers for October

2014, No. 73, Vol. IX, 2-3 (2014).
22 Id.
23 These four countries, China (mainland-born), India, Mexico, and the Philippines will
heretofore be known as “traditionally oversubscribed” nations, as they are subject to
waiting periods that differ from the rest of the world.
24 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Immigrant Numbers for October
2014, No. 73, Vol. IX, at 2 (2014).
25 Id.
26 Id.
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waiting period of nearly eight years longer than any other country
other than China.27
III.

THE EB-5 PROGRAM

In furtherance of its objectives embodied in the INA, Congress
passed the Immigration Act of 1990 (“IMMACT”), the most
comprehensive change to the immigration system since 1965.28
IMMACT has four main policy goals.29 First, it established overall
limits on immigration through the adoption of a flexible cap on
total numbers.30 Second, it permitted the continued reunification
of close family members.31 Third, IMMACT sought to meet labor
market needs by increasing the number of immigrants admitted
for employment-based reasons and giving higher priority to the
entry of professionals and highly skilled workers.32 Fourth, it
sought to provide greater diversity through new opportunities for
migration from countries with relatively small numbers of
immigrants to the United States.33
Despite these broad reforms, IMMACT still fails immigrants
from traditionally oversubscribed nations. Immigrants from these
nations are still subject to longer waiting periods for visa
processing than immigrants from other chargeability areas.
Most significantly to this Note, IMMACT created a new visa
category with the aim of attracting investment capital to the
country and creating new jobs for U.S. workers: the EB-5 visa.34
The EB-5 program is based on our nation’s twin interest in
promoting the immigration of people who, first, invest their capital
in new, restructured, or expanded businesses in the United States,

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id.
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1994 Executive Summary, 33 (1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ICF International, Study of the United States Immigrant Investor Pilot Program
(EB-5), 1 (2010) available at
<https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/E
B-5/EB5-Report-2010.pdf>.
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and second, create much-needed jobs for U.S. workers.35 Under
the EB-5 program, foreign nationals are eligible for conditional
permanent residency in the United States (a “green card”) for two
years36 by investing $1 million37 in a U.S. business that would
directly create at least ten full-time jobs.38 After two years, if the
foreign national has satisfied the conditions of the EB-5 program
and other criteria of eligibility, the conditions are removed and the
immigrant investor may become an unconditional lawful
permanent resident of the United States.39
A. EB-5 Program Advantages to the Immigrant Investor
The EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa Program is
advantageous to the immigrant investor in a multitude of ways.
First, the EB-5 visa has always been “current.” This means that
there is no waiting list for prospective immigrants; as soon as they
submit their application, USCIS will begin processing their
application. This makes the EB-5 program particularly appealing
to those immigrants who, because of circumstance, are subject to
relatively long waiting periods. Any prospective immigrant, who,
for instance, premises his or her immigrant visa application on a
familial relationship to a U.S. citizen sibling, must wait almost
eleven years (at least) before USCIS will begin processing his or
her application. However, the same individual immigrant may (if
he or she has a minimum of $500,000 to spare) file an EB-5
immigrant visa application, which USCIS will begin processing
immediately upon receipt.

35 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy
Memorandum: EB-5 Adjudications Policy, PM-602-0083 at 1 (May 30, 2013) available at
<https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2013/May/EB5%20Adjudications%20PM%20(Approved%20as%20final%205-30-13).pdf>.
36 Id. at 1-2. Congress enacted this two-year conditional permanent residency status to
ensure compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirements and to ensure that the
investment of capital in fact created the requisite ten full-time jobs in the United States.
37 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(f)(2), an immigrant investor need only invest a
minimum of $500,000 in capital if he or she invests his or her capital in a new commercial
enterprise that is principally doing business in, and creates jobs in, a rural area or a
“targeted employment area,” defined as an area with a rate of unemployment at least 150%
of the national average rate of unemployment.
38 ICF International, supra note 34, at 1.
39 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 1.
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B. Disparate Impact of Investor Visa Program
The EB-5 investor visa program is inherently discriminatory.
The required initial investment of $500,000 (and in many cases,
$1,000,000) in a new commercial enterprise represents a massive
barrier to participation in the program for immigrants from
developing nations or of lesser means. Even more burdensome,
the investment must be placed “at risk” for the purpose of
generating a return.40 In other words, prospective immigrant
investors are unable to satisfy the investment of capital
requirement by merely financing debt as opposed to equity
investments.41 They must not only have $500,000, but also be in a
position to place such a vast sum of money at risk, with no
guarantee of its return.
This economically discriminatory policy gives rise to disparate
results among prospective immigrants from different countries.
According to a 2005 report of the United States Government
Accountability Office,42 eighty-three percent of the EB-5 visas
issued from 1992 to 2004 have been issued to immigrant investors
from Asia.43 More specifically, Taiwan alone accounted for thirtynine percent of the EB-5 visas issued.44 During the same
timeframe, South America and Africa have each only accounted
for two percent of the EB-5 visas issued, or 143 and 122 visas
respectively.
A 2010 study by ICF International yielded similar results.45
Based on a sample of 295 immigrant investors, ICF found that
seventy-eight percent of immigrant investors are from Asia.46
Furthermore, Europe was the second-most represented continent,
accounting for just over fifteen percent of the total number of
issued EB-5 visas.47 Meanwhile, North America, South America
40 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2).
41 U.S. GAO, Immigrant Investors: Small Number of Participants Attributed to

Pending Regulations and Other Factors, GAO 05-256, 12 (2005) available at
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05256.pdf>.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 15.
44 Id. at 12.
45 See ICF International, supra note 34.
46 Id. at 9.
47 Id.
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and Africa accounted for less than seven percent of the issued EB5 visas combined.48 Even more striking are the statistics
pertaining to EB-5 investors from the traditionally oversubscribed
nations: Mexico, India, the Philippines, and China (mainland).
1. Mexico
In the fiscal year 2013, Mexican immigrant investors accounted
for sixty-three of the 7,312 total EB-5 visas issued—less than one
percent.49 Indeed, 2013 actually marked a significant uptick in
EB-5 visa subscription among prospective Mexican immigrants.
Over the four prior fiscal years, from 2009 to 2012, there had only
been thirty-seven total EB-5 visas issued to Mexican immigrant
investors.50
2.

India

In the fiscal year 2013, Indian immigrant investors
accounted for thirty-five of the 7,312 total EB-5 visas issued—less
than half of one percent.51 Over the four prior fiscal years, from
2009 to 2012, there had only been eighty-nine total EB-5 visas
issued to Indian immigrant investors.52
3.

Philippines

In the fiscal year 2013, Filipino immigrant investors
accounted for only five of the 7,312 total EB-5 visas issued—a
statistically irrelevant figure.53 Even more bleak, over the four
prior fiscal years, from 2009 to 2012, there had only been two total
EB-5 visas issued to Filipino immigrant investors.54

48 Id.
49 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Visa Office 2013, VI.

Preference Immigrant Visas Issued (by Foreign State of Chargeability): Fiscal Year 2013,
Part 4 (Employment 5th, Schedule A, Grand Total) (2009-2013).
50 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Visa Office 2013, VI.
Preference Immigrant Visas Issued (by Foreign State of Chargeability): Fiscal Year 2013,
Part 4 (Employment 5th, Schedule A, Grand Total) (2009-2013).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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4.

China (mainland)

China stands in stark contrast against the other
traditionally oversubscribed nations. Over the four prior fiscal
years, from 2009 to 2012, Chinese immigrant investors accounted
for over seventy-four percent of all issued EB-5 visas.55 According
to the most recently available data, this pattern is only trending
upward. In the fiscal year 2013, Chinese immigrant investors
accounted for 6,250 of the 7,312 total EB-5 visas issued—over
eighty-five percent.56 For the first time ever, in the fiscal year
2014, the EB-5 visa category was made unavailable to Chinese
immigrant investors, as demand exceeded the statutory
allocation.57
IV.

THE IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PILOT PROGRAM

The EB-5 program provisions of IMMACT were originally
contemplated to confer lawful permanent resident status to
immigrant investors who not only invested, but also engaged in
the
management
of
employment-creating
commercial
enterprises.58 The program requires the immigrant investor to be
so engaged, either through the exercise of day-to-day managerial
responsibility or through policy formulation.59 It is not enough
that the immigrant investor maintain a purely passive role in
regard to his or her investment.60 USCIS requires extensive
documentation of the immigrant investor’s active involvement.61
55 Id.
56 Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report of the Visa Office 2013, VI.

Preference Immigrant Visas Issued (by Foreign State of Chargeability): Fiscal Year 2013,
Part 4 (Employment 5th, Schedule A, Grand Total) (2009-2013).
57 Visa Services, U.S. Dep’t of State, Effective immediately Saturday, August 23, 2014
the China Employment Fifth (EB-5) preference category has become “Unavailable” for the
remainder of FY-2014, (Aug. 23, 2014). “This action is necessary because the maximum
level of numbers which may be made available for use by China EB-5 applicants during
FY-2014 have been reached.”
58 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 2.
59 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(5).
60 Id.
61 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(5)(i)-(iii). The petition must be accompanied by: “(i) A statement
of the position title that the [immigrant investor] has or will have in the new enterprise
and a complete description of the position’s duties; or, (ii) Evidence that the [immigrant
investor] is a corporate officer or a member of the corporate board or directors; or, (iii) If the
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In 1992, Congress relaxed the requirements of the EB-5
program, creating the Immigrant Investor Pilot Program (“Pilot
Program”) in order to attract a larger number of applicants.62 The
Pilot Program did not replace the EB-5 program; it merely created
a distinct set of statutory requirements for participation in the EB5 program.63 Of the 10,000 EB-5 visas available annually, 3,000
are specifically reserved for immigrant investors who participate
in the Pilot Program.64
The Pilot Program65 is advantageous to immigrant investors in
two major ways. First, immigrant investors can invest in
designated “regional centers” that place and manage investments
on behalf of the investors.66 Second, this newer program provides
that the full-time positions can be created either directly or
indirectly by the commercial enterprise in which the investment is
placed.67
A. The Regional Centers
A regional center is “any economic unit, public or private, which
is involved with the promotion of economic growth, including
increased export sales, improved regional productivity, job
creation, and increased domestic capital investment.”68 This may
include entities ranging from a state government agency to a
consortium of exporters, specifically any entity benefiting a
particular geographic of the United States.69 These entities
formulate a business plan and successfully operate almost all
business types.70
new enterprise is a partnership, either limited or general, evidence that the [immigrant
investor] is engaged in either direct managerial or policy making activities. . . .”
62 ICF International, supra note 34, at 1.
63 Because of the relaxed statutory standards, EB-5 immigrant investors participating
in the program overwhelming utilized the Pilot Program.
64 Id.
65 PL 112-176 §1, 126 Stat 1325 (Sept. 28, 2012). The so-called “pilot” program has
been repeatedly extended, most recently to Sept. 30, 2015. Congress affirmed its
commitment to this program by removing the word “pilot” from its reauthorization of the
program, indicating its permanence. Still, it remains known as the “Pilot Program.”
66 ICF International, supra note 34, at 1.
67 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(4)(iii).
68 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e).
69 9 FAM 42.32(E) N8, “Regional Center” Defined.
70 Id.
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The regional center model within the Pilot Program can offer an
immigrant investor already-defined investment opportunities,
thereby reducing the immigrant investor’s responsibility to
identify acceptable investment vehicles.71 Most importantly, the
Pilot Program permits immigrant investors to place passive
investments with the regional center.72 This dramatically reduces
the burden placed upon prospective immigrant investors: they are
no longer required to be engaged in the management of
employment-creating commercial enterprises, either through the
exercise of day-to-day managerial responsibility or through policy
formulation.
To date, USCIS has approved approximately six hundred
regional centers.73 This represents a massive increase in the
number of approved regional centers nationwide.74 In recent
years, developers seeking to raise capital have increasingly taken
interest in the EB-5 program, specifically the Pilot Program.75
Utilizing the program, developers enjoy relatively inexpensive
borrowing costs, ranging from three to five percent.76
Furthermore, developers are under no pressure to produce high
rates of return, as immigrant investors are primarily concerned
with obtaining permanent residency.77
B. Direct vs. Indirect Jobs
The Investor Pilot program provides that the statutorily
mandated ten full-time positions can be created either directly or

71 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 14.
72 Dennis J. Olle and Julie C. Ferguson, EB-5: Project Finance for U.S. Developers and

Businesses,
LEXOLOGY,
Jan.
29,
2013,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4422a94d-22d3-45d9-9ee5-41e5d20428ff .
73 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigrant Investor Regional Centers,
2014,
available
at
<http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/permanentworkers/employment-based-immigration-fifth-preference-eb-5/immigrant-investorregional-centers>.
74 ICF International, supra note 34, at 78.. “As of June 24, 2010, there were 92 USCISapproved Regional Centers across the U.S. inclusive of the Territory of Guam.” Therefore,
in the last four and a half years, USCIS has approved more than five hundred regional
centers.
75 See Olle and Ferguson, supra note 72.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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indirectly by the new commercial enterprise.78 Direct positions are
those that provide services or labor for the new commercial
enterprise and receive wages or other remuneration directly from
the new commercial enterprise.79 Indirect jobs are those that are
held outside of the new commercial enterprise but are created as
a result of the new commercial enterprise.80 For example, indirect
jobs can include, but are not limited to, those held by employees of
the producers of materials, equipment, or services used by the new
commercial enterprise.81 Further, the indirect jobs qualify and
count towards the immigrant investor’s statutory requirement
even if they are located outside of the geographic boundaries of the
regional center.82 The ability to rely upon indirect job creation
substantially lowers the burden placed upon immigrant investors
in meeting the requirements of the EB-5 visa program.
Taken together, these two major changes implemented by the
Pilot Program illustrates not only Congress’ desire to make the
EB-5 program more appealing to prospective immigrant investors,
but also a broader shift in policy: favoring the goal of capital
investment at the cost of employment creation.83 Initially, the EB5 program was criticized for permitting foreign nationals to “buy”
a visa.84 With the passage of the Pilot Program, it appeared as
though Congress “green lit” the sale of visas. By permitting
immigrant investors to make passive qualifying investments in a
regional center, it eliminated the requirement that immigrant
investors actually create an employment-creating commercial
enterprise. Immigrant investors now need only cut a check.
Moreover, the ability to rely on indirect job creation to fulfill the
requirements of the Pilot Program attenuates the connection
between the immigrant investor’s investment and actual
78
79
80
81
82
83

8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(4)(iii).
8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e).
U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 18.
Id.
Id.
This shift in policy is further demonstrated by change in statute. On November 2,
2002, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(i) was removed from the statute, which had required that the
new commercial enterprise be one that the immigrant investor “has established,” him or
herself.
84 101 CONG. REC. 14,286 (1989) (statement of Sen. Bumpers). “But the rich ought not
to be able to buy their way into the country.”
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employment creation. An immigrant investor may use complex
economic reports such as multiplier tables and feasibility studies
as evidence of the number of jobs created.85

V.

OTHER SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EB-5 PROGRAM’S
ABILITY TO CREATE JOBS

A. Accounting for Jobs Created
A shortcoming of the EB-5 program, and particularly of the
Pilot Program, is the manner by which USCIS credits the number
of jobs created as a result of an immigrant investor’s capital
infusion. According to a 2005 report by the United States
Government Accountability Office, it is impossible to determine
how many jobs immigrant investors have in fact established
because of USCIS’s accounting methods.86 During the adjudication
process, USCIS adjudicators ensure that each business creates the
minimum requirements of ten full-time jobs.87 However, if there
are non-EB-5 investors involved or the investment is part of a
greater overall business expansion, USCIS credits the single EB5 investor with the total of all jobs created even though many of
the jobs are not the result of his portion of the investment.88 In one
particular case, USCIS credited a single immigrant investor with
creating 1,143 jobs based on a $1.5 million investment.89 Although
this single investment could not have possibly created all 1,143
jobs, for adjudicative purposes, when the immigrant investor is the
only one seeking the immigration benefit of conditional permanent
residency, all jobs are attributed to that investor.90 This is true
even if it is the capital of others that is in fact fueling the

85 9 FAM 42.32(E) N10, Meeting the Job Creation Requirement.
86 U.S. GAO, GAO 05-256, Immigrant Investors: Small Number of Participants

Attributed to Pending Regulations and Other Factors (2005), 19, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05256.pdf.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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enterprise.91 In this case, the immigrant investor’s capital
contribution represented a small fraction of a multimillion-dollar
expansion of an existing business that involved multiple
franchises and other non-EB-5 investors.92
The problem with USCIS’s accounting system is that it “credits”
an immigrant investor with the creation of a job rather than
insisting that the immigrant investor actually create one. It is
easy to imagine a scenario in which a large real estate developer
would utilize the EB-5 program in order to finance an alreadyexisting project at low interest rates. In such a scenario, the
project’s feasibility would not be contingent upon securing EB-5
capital—the project (and the jobs it creates) would come into
existence irrespective of an immigrant investor’s capital infusion.
However, the real estate developer augments his or her bottom
line by financing the project at favorable interest rates offered by
EB-5 capital investments.
The scenario described above is easy to imagine because it has
been an on-going reality. In recent years, businesses, particularly
real estate and project developers, seeking to raise capital have
increasingly utilized the EB-5 Program.93 Today, real estate
developers often use EB-5 capital in lieu of traditional mezzanine
loans.94 Unlike a traditional mortgage, real estate mezzanine
loans are collateralized by equity in the real estate developer itself
rather than the property.95 Because of the higher risk associated
with mezzanine loans, lenders typically charge exorbitant interest
rates and fees, ranging from twelve to twenty percent.96 As a
result, EB-5 investments are tremendously attractive to real
estate and project developers. A number of high-profile real estate
91 Id.
92 U.S. GAO, GAO 05-256, Immigrant Investors:

Small Number of Participants
Attributed to Pending Regulations and Other Factors (2005), 19, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05256.pdf.
93 Julie C. Ferguson, EB-5 Options for Developers, CFJBLAW.COM, (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.cfjblaw.com/eb-5-options-for-developers-02-11-2013/.
94 Wessem Amin, EB-5 Regional Centers in Project Finance: Using EB-5 Capital in lieu
of Mezzanine Financing, DHARLAWLLP.COM, (Nov. 25, 2013) available at
http://dharlawllp.wordpress.com/2013/11/25/wassem-amin-eb-5-project-finance/
(noting
“[i]n the context of real estate finance, mezzanine loans are typically used as a source of
supplementary financing for development projects.”).
95 Id.
96 Id.
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developers have established regional centers in order to attract
EB-5 investments to finance their many projects.97
B. Bridge Financing
In order to comport with business realities, USCIS has adopted
a stance permitting the use of “bridge financing” in EB-5
investment projects.98 The developer or the principal of the new
commercial enterprise, either directly or through a separate jobcreating entity, may utilize interim or “bridge” financing, in the
form of debt or equity, prior to the receipt of EB-5 capital.99 In a
2013 policy memorandum issued by USCIS clarifying the
adjudication policy of EB-5 immigrant investor visa applications,
it stated, “. . . even if the EB-5 financing was not contemplated
prior to acquiring the temporary or ‘bridge’ financing, as long as
the financing to be replaced was contemplated as short-term
temporary financing which would subsequently be replaced, the
infusion of EB-5 financing could still result in the creation of, and
credit for, new jobs.”100 According to USCIS, developers should not
be precluded from using EB-5 capital as an alternative source to
replace temporary financing simply because it was not
contemplated prior to obtaining the bridge or temporary
financing.101 This policy pronouncement further illustrates the
inherent problem with the EB-5 program: it does not create jobs;
it merely allocates or “credits” the creation of jobs to prospective
immigrants that would have been created regardless of their
investment.
The strength of capital markets is undoubtedly crucial to the
development of the nation’s economy. Indeed, the availability of
credit is critical to a sustained and healthy economy. However,
the evaluation of the EB-5 program is incomplete unless we are
equally critical of the program’s ability to deliver on its other goal:
the creation of jobs.
97 Related Companies and Silverstein Properties, developers of the Hudson Yards
Redevelopment and World Trade Center respectively, have each established regional
centers in recent years.
98 U.S Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 35, at 15.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
101 Id.
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THE EB-7 IMMIGRANT JOB CREATOR VISA

This Note proposes a solution: The EB-7 Immigrant Job
Creator Visa. The EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa would read
as follows:
Congress, recognizing the essential role of immigrants in
building our nation and the need for domestic job creation, does
hereby establish the Seventh Preference Category for
Employment-based Immigrant Visas.
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(7) Job-Creator Visa
(A)

In general.
Visas shall be made available, in a number not to exceed 7.1
percent of such worldwide level to qualified immigrants seeking to
enter the United States less the number of visas issued pursuant
to § 1153(b)(5) of this title in the prior fiscal year, to qualified
immigrants seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of
engaging in a new commercial enterprise (including limited
partnership) —
(i) in which such alien has invested or, is actively in the
process of investing, capital in an amount not less than the amount
specified in subparagraph (C), and
(ii) which will benefit the United States economy and create
full-time employment for not fewer than 10 United States citizens
or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence or other
immigrants lawfully authorized to be employed in the United
States (other than the immigrant and the immigrant's spouse,
sons, or daughters.
(B)

Target employment areas defined.
In this paragraph, the term “targeted employment area”
means, at the time of the investment, a rural area or an area,
which has experienced high unemployment (of at least 150 percent
of the national average rate).
(C) Amount of capital required.
(i) In general
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Except as otherwise provided in this subparagraph the
amount, of capital required under subparagraph (A) shall be the
greater of either-(I)
$200,000; or
(II)
20% of the immigrant job-creator’s net worth, to
be calculated by reasonable economic or
accounting methodologies.
(ii) Adjustment for target employment areas defined
In the case of investment made in a target employment area, the
immigrant investor may reduce his or her required investment
under this subparagraph by 25%.
(iii) Limitations
Under this subparagraph, an immigrant job-creator shall not be
required to invest capital in excess of $400,000.
(D)

Full-time employment defined.
In this paragraph, the term “full-time employment” means
employment in a position that requires at least 35 hours of service
per week at any time, regardless of who fills the position.
(E)

Job creation requirements.
An immigrant job-creator seeking an immigrant visa under
this subparagraph must demonstrate that his or her qualifying
investment is in a commercial enterprise-(i) that is controlled by the immigrant job creator through
the exercise of day-to-day managerial responsibility; and
(ii) that directly creates ten full-time jobs.
(F)

“But for” causation requirement.
In order to demonstrate compliance with subparagraph
(E)(ii) of this subsection, a immigrant job creator must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that each of the 10 jobs required
under subparagraph (A)(ii) would not have been created but for
the immigrant job creator’s qualifying investment.
USCIS shall promulgate rules in accordance with this
subparagraph to adjudicate compliance with the “but for”
causation requirement on a case-by-case basis.
(G)

Eligibility.
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Only immigrant job creators from nations that, pursuant to
8 U.S.C. 1153(e), are subject to visa cut-off dates that differ from
all chargeability areas, may apply for the EB-7 Immigrant Job
Creator Visa Program. On the date of the enactment of this
provision, only immigrant job creator from the following nations
may apply:
(i) China (mainland born);
(ii) India;
(iii) Mexico; and
(iv) The Philippines.
VII.

THE BENEFITS OF THE EB-7 IMMIGRANT JOB CREATOR
VISA PROGRAM

The EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Program addresses many
issues with our current body of immigration law with a relatively
small amendment. First, the EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa
Program will only be made available to immigrants from
traditionally oversubscribed nations. This provision has two
purposes. First, it will have the ameliorative effect of granting
admission to immigrants who are otherwise subject to
substantially longer waiting periods than all other immigrants.
This comports with the mandate of the INA. Second, it will
substantially limit the applicability of this relatively small
ameliorative legislation to those immigrants most in need of relief.
Second, the proposed EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa
Program does not affect the overall annual limit on immigration.
By only issuing visas equal to the difference between the total
allocation of EB-5 visas and the number of EB-5 visas actually
issued, the EB-7 visa only seeks to make-up this gap in
enrollment.102 It will be for Congress to determine whether it be
prudent to increase the overall level of immigration in order to
issue a higher number of EB-7 immigrant job creator visas.
Next, the capital investment requirement is significantly
reduced. The EB-7 immigrant job creator’s contribution to the
102 In order to calculate the number of EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visas to be issued
in a fiscal year, the program uses the number of EB-5 visas issued in the prior fiscal year
as a rough estimate for the number of EB-5 visas that will likely be issued in the current
fiscal year.
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United States will be the creation of new jobs for U.S. workers, not
the infusion of capital. Acknowledging that some investment of
capital is necessary for the creation of a new job creating,
commercial enterprise, a minimum investment of $150,000 (not to
exceed $400,000) is required. The immigrant job creator is
incentivized to establish a job-creating commercial enterprise in a
target employment area, where the unemployment rate is 150% of
the national average employment rate. The EB-7 immigrant job
creator’s primary investment will be of his or her labor, skills, and
entrepreneurial talents in creating an employment sustaining
commercial enterprise.
In addition, the EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa Program
requires that the immigrant job creator’s investment is made in a
commercial enterprise that is controlled by the immigrant job
creator through the exercise of day-to-day managerial
responsibility and that directly creates ten full-time jobs. This
provision of the proposed EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa
Program is to advance its purpose: the actual creation of jobs for
U.S. workers, not merely awarding “credit” for the creation of jobs.
Lastly, in furtherance of the EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator
Visa Program’s purpose, the proposal introduces a causation
requirement. In order to ensure that the prospective immigrant
job creator did in fact create the statutorily mandated ten jobs, he
or she must be able to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that each of the positions would not have been created
but for the immigrant job creator’s qualifying investment. Again,
this provision is included in the proposal in order to ensure the
actual creation of jobs for U.S. workers.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In order to better serve the immigration policy mandate of the
INA by admitting immigrants on a “fair, rational, [and] humane”
basis that is “in the national interest,” we must be critical of our
current immigration laws. The EB-7 Immigrant Job Creator Visa
Program advances this overarching policy, while fulfilling the
promise of the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa Program:
encouraging foreign investment in the United States and, more
importantly, creating jobs for U.S. workers.

